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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff Irving Braun's appeal because, as 
explained further in Part I of the argument below, this appeal suffers from two 
fundamental procedural and jurisdictional defects. 
First, Braun does not challenge the order from which he is appealing. Braun 
states in his Notice of Appeal that he is appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 order 
dismissing his amended derivative complaint for lack of standing. (Appellant's 
Docketing Statement at p. 2) Yet, Braun makes clear in his opening brief that he is not 
challenging the trial court's conclusion in the May 11, 2009 order that he lacked standing 
to assert his purported derivative claims. In short, Braun does not contend that the trial 
court erred in entering the May 11, 2009 order from which he purports to appeal. This 
alone compels dismissal of this appeal or affirmance of the trial court's order. 
The second defect in this appeal is that Braun is not appealing any formal ruling 
by the trial court at all. Rather, Braun is attempting to appeal from, and challenge, 
preliminary oral remarks made by the trial court at the October 15, 2008 hearing on 
defendant Nevada Chemicals, Inc.'s motion to dismiss Braun's initial complaint, which 
purported to assert "direct" (as opposed to "derivative") claims against defendants, and 
which Braun voluntarily withdrew before filing his amended derivative complaint. 
Indeed, the thrust of Braun's appeal is that "the trial court erred in concluding that 
plaintiffs claims are derivative rather than direct" when it made those remarks, even 
though the court's informal comments were never the basis of any ruling or order. {See, 
e.g., Appellant's Br. at 15-24) 
As explained further below, Braun's attempt to challenge the trial court's 
October 15, 2008 oral comments is improper. As an initial matter, the trial court never 
"concluded" that Braun's claims were derivative; to the contrary, it made clear to the 
parties that its comments were preliminary and that it could change its mind. But even if 
the trial court did "conclude" that Braun's claims were derivative, which it did not, oral 
remarks such as the ones Braun is attempting to challenge here are simply not appealable. 
Finally, and more fundamentally, Braun is attempting in this appeal to resurrect the direct 
claims that he voluntarily withdrew in the trial court. Having withdrawn those claims 
voluntarily below, however, Braun has no right to challenge their purported "dismissal" 
in this appeal. 
For all of these reasons, Braun has no right to bring this appeal, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear it, and the appeal should be dismissed. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issues for review: 
1. Is there a proper jurisdictional or legal basis for this appeal where, as here, 
plaintiff Braun does not challenge the trial court's May 11, 2009 order dismissing his 
amended derivative complaint for lack of standing — the order from which he purports to 
appeal? 
2. Is there a proper jurisdictional or legal basis for this appeal where, as here, 
Braun is attempting to challenge preliminary and informal oral remarks made by the trial 
court, and to resurrect claims that he voluntarily withdrew in favor of his amended 
derivative complaint? 
3. Did the district court err in holding in the alternative that Braun's exclusive 
remedy was a statutory appraisal proceeding where, as here, his challenge to the Buyout 
Group's October 22, 2008 acquisition of Nevada Chemicals, Inc. boiled down to nothing 
more than a complaint about the adequacy of the purchase price? 
4. Even if he had not withdrawn them, does Braun properly characterize the 
claims asserted in his initial complaint as direct (as opposed to derivative) under Utah law 
where, as here, he does not and cannot allege that he was injured in a manner distinct 
from other shareholders of NCEM? 
These are questions of law reviewed for correctness. Citizens for Responsible 
Transp. v. Draper City, 2008 UT 43, % 8, 190 P.3d 1245. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises out of the so-called "Buyout Group" defendants'1 acquisition of 
nominal defendant Nevada Chemicals, Inc. ("NCEM" or the "Company"). 
On September 5, 2008, NCEM announced that it had signed an agreement to be 
acquired by the Buyout Group, via a tender offer, for $13.37 per share. (R.50) Plaintiff 
Irving Braun, a serial plaintiff,2 commenced this action just one week later, on 
September 12, 2008, before NCEM had filed or was even required to file with the SEC 
disclosure forms relating to the transaction. (R.l-13) Braun alleged that NCEM's 
directors3 breached their fiduciary duties to NCEM by failing to negotiate an adequate 
purchase price and by failing to disclose material information about the transaction. (Id.) 
1 The Buyout Group defendants are Oaktree Capital Management, L.P., Calypso 
Acquisition Corp., Cyanco Holding Corp., and OCM Principal Opportunities Fund 
IV, L.P. 
2 Braun has been a plaintiff in at least ten shareholder lawsuits. (R.799); see also 
Braun v. Knight Trading Group., et al, 2:00-cv-06247 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2000); Braun 
v. Razorfish, Inc. et al, l:01-cv-00427 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2001); Braun v. 
Autoweb.com, Inc. et al, l:01-cv-04120 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001); Braun v. Andrx 
Corp., et al, 0:02-cv-60496 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2002); Braun et al. v. Vaxgen, Inc. et 
al, 3:03-cv-01264 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2003); Sekuk Global, et al. v. KVH Indust, 
Inc., et al, l:04-cv-00306 (D.C.R.I. Jul. 21, 2004); Braun v. Alvarion, Ltd., et al, 
l:07-cv-02096 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007); Stern v. Bank of N.Y., 7:94-cv-03473 
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1994); Tabak v. Mobile Oil Credit Corp., 7:97-cv-06349 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1997); Braun v. GT Solar International, Inc., et al, l:08-cv-
00312 (D.N.H. Aug. 1, 2008); In re IPO Securities Litig., et al, l:21-mc-00092 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2001); Irving S. Braun v. Nevada Chemicals Inc. et al, 080919636 
(Utah 3rd Dist. Ct. Sep. 12, 2008). 
3 The NCEM director defendants are E. Bryan Bagley, Nathan L. Wade, John T. Day, 
James E. Solomon, and M. Garfield Cook. 
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Braun alleged further that the Buyout Group defendants had "aided and abetted" the 
directors' alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. (R.9 at ffif 37-45) Based on these 
allegations, Braun purported to assert various "direct" (as opposed to "derivative") claims 
for breach of duty against defendants, and sought to enjoin the Buyout Group's 
acquisition of NCEM. (R.12) 
On September 20, 2008, NCEM moved to dismiss Braun's initial complaint on the 
ground that Braun was attempting to assert derivative claims belonging to NCEM (as 
opposed to direct claims belonging to plaintiff personally), and that Braun had failed to 
satisfy any of the conditions precedent for asserting derivative claims. (R. 114-26) In 
response, Braun argued that his direct claims were proper but, if they were not, he should 
be granted leave to file an amended derivative complaint on behalf of the corporation. 
(R.507-21) 
On October 7, 2008, the trial court conducted a telephonic conference with 
counsel for the respective parties. (R.423-24) At that time, the court scheduled a 
preliminary injunction hearing for October 15, 2008. (Id.) The court also scheduled oral 
argument on NCEM's motion to dismiss for that same date. (Id.) 
On October 15, 2008, two days before the Buyout Group's tender offer for 
NCEM's shares was set to expire, Braun's counsel appeared at the scheduled hearing and 
announced (1) that Braun had not appeared for the hearing, and (2) that Braun was 
voluntarily withdrawing his motion for a preliminary injunction blocking the acquisition. 
(R.1167 at pp. 2, 10, 21) Braun also withdrew his initial complaint and sought and 
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obtained leave from the trial court to file his amended derivative complaint. (R.1167 at 
p. 19-20) 
The Buyout Group's tender offer ended two days later, on October 17, 2008, with 
holders of more than 90% of NCEM's common stock tendering their shares. (R.1069) 
The Buyout Group paid for and acquired those tendered shares on October 22, 2008 and, 
that same day, acquired NCEM's remaining shares through a "short form" merger that 
did not require a shareholder vote. (Id.) Upon consummation of that short-form merger, 
Braun ceased being a shareholder of NCEM. 
Braun filed his amended derivative complaint on October 22, 2008 — the same 
day the Buyout Group completed its acquisition of NCEM. (R.949) Braun's amended 
derivative complaint echoed the allegations in his original complaint and sought to enjoin 
the Buyout Group's acquisition of NCEM, or to rescind the transaction in the event the 
acquisition had already occurred. (R.967-68) Of course, it had already occurred. 
(R.1069) 
The defendants then moved to dismiss Braun's amended derivative complaint on 
the ground that, because he was no longer a shareholder of the Company, Braun lacked 
standing to assert his derivative claims. (R.1099, 989) On May 11, 2009, the trial court 
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Braun's amended derivative complaint. 
(R. 1148-50) The trial court agreed with the defendants that, because Braun was no 
longer a shareholder of NCEM, he lacked standing to bring his derivative claims. 
(R.1149) The trial court also held in the alternative that, because Braun's complaint 
boiled down only to a claim that the Buyout Group's tender offer price was too low, his 
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exclusive remedy was to exercise his statutory right to an appraisal of his shares pursuant 
to Section 16-10a-1301, et seq. of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act. (Id.) 
This is Braun's appeal from the trial court's May 11, 2009 order dismissing his 
amended derivative complaint for lack of standing. (Appellant's Br. at 14) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows. 
I. The Announcement Of The Buyout Group's Agreement To Acquire NCEM. 
On September 5, 2008, NCEM announced that it had signed an agreement to be 
acquired by the Buyout Group, via a tender offer, for $13.37 per share. (R.118, 50) 
NCEM also announced that additional details regarding the tender offer and the 
transaction would be disclosed in tender offer documents that would be filed with the 
SEC concurrently with the commencement of the Buyout Group's tender offer. (R.49 et 
seq.) 
NCEM's announcement marked the end of a lengthy auction process conducted by 
NCEM's board of directors, who had no future monetary or employment interests in 
NCEM and, like NCEM's public shareholders, every incentive to get the highest possible 
price for their NCEM shares. (R.63, 799-812) NCEM's board did just that. The Buyout 
Group's offer of $13.37 per share beat NCEM's next best offer by more than a dollar per 
share, and it provided NCEM's shareholders with a 36% premium over the closing 
market price of NCEM's stock on the date of the announcement — a remarkable 
achievement given the deteriorating equity markets at the time. (R.118, 57-59, 800) For 
these and other reasons, a disinterested financial analyst who reviewed the transaction 
concluded not only that the price was fair, but that it was at the upper end of the range of 
fairness. (R.76-77) 
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II. Rraun's Initial Complaint And Motion For A Preliminary Injunction. 
Braun, a professional plaintiff who owned a mere .0028% of NCEM's outstanding 
common stock, commenced this action just one week later, on September 12, 2008. (R.l, 
13) In true strike-suit fashion, Braun did so before the defendants filed their tender offer 
documents with the SEC, and before the Buyout Group commenced its tender offer for 
NCEM shares on September 19, 2008. (R.952 at \ 5; R.963 at If 53) Not afraid to shoot 
first and ask questions later, Braun alleged in his initial complaint that NCEM's directors 
breached their fiduciary duties to NCEM by failing to negotiate an adequate purchase 
price, and by failing to disclose material information about the transaction in NCEM's 
yet-to-be-filed SEC Form 14D-9. (R.2 at \ 1; R.9-12) Not content to stop there, Plaintiff 
alleged further that the Buyout Group defendants had "aided and abetted" the directors' 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, presumably by engaging in arm's-length negotiations 
with NCEM's representatives with respect to the offer price. (R.10 at ffif 37, 40; R.11 at 
If 43) Based on these allegations, Braun purported to assert, on behalf of a class 
consisting of all of NCEM's shareholders, various "direct" (as opposed to "derivative") 
claims for breach of duty against defendants, and sought to enjoin the Buyout Group's 
acquisition of NCEM (R.2 at \ 1; R.l2), although he did not simultaneously move for a 
preliminary injunction. 
The defendants moved to dismiss Braun's initial complaint. (R.l 14-26) In its 
September 30, 2008 motion, NCEM argued inter alia that, under Utah law, Braun was 
attempting to assert derivative claims that belonged to NCEM (as opposed to direct 
claims that belonged to Braun personally), and that Braun had failed to satisfy any of the 
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conditions precedent and unique pleading requirements applicable to such derivative 
claims under Utah law. (R.122-24)4 
Two days later (and three weeks after he filed his initial complaint), on October 2, 
2008, Braun filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to block the Buyout Group's 
acquisition of NCEM. (R. 180) Braun argued in support of this motion that he would 
suffer irreparable injury if the Buyout Group completed its acquisition of NCEM, since it 
would be impractical to try to unwind the acquisition after it occurred. (R.207-08) By 
October 2, 2008, the Buyout Group's tender offer was already more than two weeks old, 
and the tender offer was scheduled to expire on October 17, 2008. (R.78) Thus, Braun 
requested an expedited hearing on his motion for a preliminary injunction. (R.181) The 
trial court granted Braun's request; it set his motion for an evidentiary hearing on 
October 15, 2008. (R.423) 
4 Utah law requires plaintiffs to satisfy several conditions precedent and to meet unique 
pleading requirements in order to maintain a derivative action. For example, plaintiffs 
must submit a written demand that the board of directors take suitable action and then 
wait ninety days before filing suit in order to give the board adequate time to 
determine whether to pursue the requested remedies. Utah Code Aim. § 16-10a-
740(3)(a)(i). In addition, Utah R. Civ. P. 23A and section 16-10a-740 of the Utah 
Code require that a derivative complaint be verified and contain averments that the 
complaint seeks to enforce a "right that the corporation . . . could have enforced and 
did not," and that "the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on the court 
that it would not otherwise have." Utah R. Civ. P 23A(a). Plaintiffs must also state 
"with particularity, the plaintiffs efforts, if any, to obtain the desired action," id. at R. 
23A(a)(4); see also Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(3)(b)(ii), and plaintiffs must also 
demonstrate that they "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders 
. . . similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation," Utah R. Civ. P. 
23A(b); Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-740(2)(b). Braun failed to comply with any of 
these requirements. 
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Meanwhile, Braun hedged his bets. Undoubtedly in response to NCEM's motion 
to dismiss his initial complaint, Braun began preparing to file a derivative complaint, 
even as he pressed forward with his direct claims. Thus, Braun executed the necessary 
"verification" required by Utah R. Civ. P. 23A(a) on October 6, 2008. (R.971) A few 
days later, on October 10, 2008, Braun submitted to NCEM's board of directors the 
written demand required by Utah Code Section 16-10a-740(3)(a)(i). (R.541-44) After 
completing these steps, Braun filed his response to NCEM's motion to dismiss the initial 
complaint. (R.507) Braun argued in his response that the initial complaint's direct 
claims against defendants were proper. (R.511-16) However, Braun also argued in the 
alternative that, in the event the trial court disagreed, he should be granted leave to file an 
amended derivative complaint on behalf of the corporation. (R.516-19, 546-47) 
Consistent with this latter argument, Braun attached to his response to NCEM's motion to 
dismiss a motion for leave to file an amended derivative complaint. (R.546) 
IIL Braun's Decisions To Withdraw His Motion For A Preliminary Injunction, 
To Withdraw His Initial Complaint, And To File His Amended Derivative 
Complaint. 
On October 15, 2008, two days before the Buyout Group's tender offer for 
NCEM's shares was set to expire, the trial court held a hearing on Braun's motion for a 
preliminary injunction and on NCEM's motion to dismiss the initial complaint. (R.1167) 
At the outset of this hearing, Braun withdrew his motion for a preliminary injunction 
without calling any witnesses or submitting any evidence. (See R.939; R.973-74; R.l 167 
at pp. 2, 21) 
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The trial court then turned to NCEM's motion to dismiss and shared with counsel 
its preliminary thoughts on the motion: 
THE COURT: Well, let me - could I give you sort of my take on this that I 
was thinking about before you all came this morning? I mean - and 
admittedly, I've not heard arguments on any of the substantive issues, but 
this is where my thinking is going after I read everything yesterday. I think 
number one, that the Motion to Dismiss is well taken. I think that the 
claim, if it's going to be brought, must be brought as a derivative action. 
So if I were to hear argument, and unless someone changed my mind for 
me this morning, which certainly could happen, I would be inclined to 
grant the Motion to Dismiss.. . . 
. . . and I'm sure the plaintiff wants to respond to what Fve said as well. 
That9s just kind of my preliminary thinking. 
(R.l 167 at pp. 12, 14) (emphasis added). 
Following these remarks from the court, counsel for the parties excused 
themselves to discuss whether it would be necessary to argue NCEM's motion to dismiss, 
or whether plaintiff would simply go ahead and file his amended derivative complaint. 
(R.l 167 at p. 14) Upon their return, counsel for NCEM informed the trial court that the 
parties had agreed that plaintiff would simply go ahead and do the latter. {Id.) 
Inexplicably, Braun's counsel then began to argue the merits of his initial 
complaint. (R. 1167 at pp. 15-16) This prompted the trial court to interject with the 
following comment: 
Well, but wait. But before we start to argue that issue . . .I 'm still not quite 
understanding. Do you not want to file the amended complaint? . . If you 
want to file the amended complaint, I'm not sure why we need to hear the 
Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 1167 at pp. 16,17) 
The following exchange ensued: 
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[BRAUN'S COUNSEL]: Well, I would appreciate the opportunity to 
explain quickly why we think that the claims are [direct], but if the Court is 
telling us that there's no way you're going to change your mind, then — 
THE COURT: I'm not telling you that. I would never do that. But let me 
hear -1 think [counsel for NCEM] has been standing up a couple of times. 
[NCEM'S COUNSEL]: I'm sorry. I just want to say that if he wants to go 
forward with the Motion to Dismiss, we have tried to expedite this process 
by stipulating to it. If he wants to go forward with arguing the Motion to 
Dismiss, we withdraw our stipulation, and we'll just go through the normal 
course of litigation . . . 
(R. 1167 at pp. 17, 18) (emphasis added). 
The Court then asked Braun's counsel, "What do you want to do?" (R.1167 at 
p. 19) Braun's counsel responded, "we'll enter the stipulation to file an amended 
complaint...." (Id.) (emphasis added). Accordingly, on October 23, 2008, the trial court 
entered a stipulated order, signed by counsel for all of the parties, including Braun, 
granting plaintiff leave to file his amended derivative complaint. (R.972-74; see also 
R.939) 
IV. The Completion Of The Buyout Group's Acquisition Of NCEM. 
The Buyout Group's tender offer ended on October 17, 2008. (R.952 at ^ 5) As 
noted above, holders of more than 90% of NCEM's common shares accepted the Buyout 
Group's tender offer (R.1007 at ^|2), undoubtedly because the offer price represented a 
36% premium over the market price of the stock immediately before the tender offer, 
(R.70). The Buyout Group paid for and acquired the tendered shares on October 22, 
2008 and, that same day, acquired NCEM's remaining shares through a "short form" 
merger that did not require a shareholder vote. (R.1007, 1016-17, 1021-23) 
13 
Notably, upon consummation of that short-form merger, Braun ceased being a 
shareholder of NCEM. (R. 1022-25) At that point, Braun retained only the right to 
receive the "Merger Consideration" of $13.37 per share or, alternatively, to receive 
payment of the appraised value of his shares in the event he exercised his dissenter's 
rights to an appraisal under Section 16-10a-1301, et seq. of the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-1301, -1302, -1328; See also 
R. 1024-25. 
V. Braun's Amended Derivative Complaint 
Braun filed his amended derivative complaint on October 22, 2008 — the same 
day the Buyout Group completed its acquisition of NCEM. (See R.949; R. 1007-08) 
Remarkably, Braun's amended complaint did not reflect completion of the tender offer or 
the consummation of the Buyout Group's acquisition of NCEM, let alone its impact on 
Braun's status as an NCEM shareholder and on his allegations and claims for relief. 
R.949-68) Instead, Braun's amended derivative complaint simply echoed the allegations 
in his original complaint and, based on these allegations, sought to enjoin the Buyout 
Group's acquisition of NCEM, or to rescind the transaction in the event it had already 
occurred. (Id.) Again, it had already occurred. 
VI. The District Court's Dismissal Of Braun's Amended Derivative Complaint. 
The defendants then moved to dismiss Braun's amended derivative complaint on 
the ground that, because he was no longer a shareholder of the Company, Braun lacked 
standing to bring a derivative claim. (R.996-98) Rule 23A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, like Rule 23.1(a) of the Federal Rules, expressly provides that a "derivative 
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action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the 
right of the corporation." Utah R. Civ. P. 23A(b); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1(a). The 
courts have construed these rules to require derivative plaintiffs to demonstrate that they 
owned stock in the corporation both at the time of the transaction and "throughout the 
pendency of the suit, which includes the bringing of the suit and its prosecution." Lewis 
v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1983). Because Braun was no longer a 
shareholder of NCEM as of the day he filed his amended derivative complaint, he failed 
to meet this threshold requirement for bringing a derivative action, and he therefore 
lacked standing to represent the corporation in a suit against its former board of directors 
and the Buyout Group. (R.996-98) 
On May 11, 2009, the trial court granted the defendants motion to dismiss Braun's 
amended derivative complaint. (R.l 148-50) The trial court agreed with the defendants 
that, because Braun was no longer a shareholder of NCEM, he could not fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of other shareholders and therefore lacked standing to 
bring his derivative claims. (R.l 149) Although it did not have to, the trial court also held 
in the alternative that, because Braun's complaint boiled down to a claim that the Buyout 
Group's tender offer price was too low, plaintiffs exclusive remedy was to exercise his 
statutory right to an appraisal of his shares pursuant to Section 16-10a-1301, et seq. of the 
Utah Revised Business Corporation Act. (R.l 149); see also Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 16-10a-1301, -1302, -1328. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal is baseless. 
As a threshold matter, this appeal suffers from two fundamental procedural and 
jurisdictional defects. The first is that Braun is not challenging the order from which he 
is appealing. Braun is appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 order dismissing his 
amended derivative complaint for lack of standing, yet Braun is not challenging the trial 
court's decision to do so. This alone requires affirmance of the trial court's May 11, 
2009 order of dismissal, or an outright dismissal of this appeal. 
The second jurisdictional defect in this appeal is that, in reality, Braun is not 
appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 order of dismissal. Rather, Braun is attempting 
to appeal from the trial court's oral remarks at the October 15, 2008 hearing on NCEM's 
motion to dismiss Braun's initial complaint — the one that Braun voluntarily withdrew. 
Braun's attempt to challenge the lower court's oral remarks is improper. To begin with, 
the trial court never "concluded" that Braun's claims were derivative, as Braun claims in 
this appeal. Even if the trial court did "conclude" that Braun's claims were derivative, 
however, oral comments from the bench such as the ones Braun is attempting to 
challenge here are simply not appealable. Even more fundamentally, Braun is attempting 
in this appeal to resurrect the direct claims that he voluntarily withdrew in the trial court. 
Having withdrawn those claims voluntarily below, Braun has no right to challenge their 
"dismissal" in this appeal. For all of these reasons, Braun has no right to bring this 
appeal, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. 
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A l t h o u g h il d id iK'il 11
 f t \ iJ> In (In MI llili'ir l inil rouiil IIIMI d e t e r m i n e d e o n v e l h tint! 
even if Braun had standing to bring his amended derivative complaint (which he did not), 
his exclusive remedy was to exercise his statutory right to an appraisal of the value of his 
shai es. 1 1 lis Cc ;i n t 1 las held til lat a dissei itii lg shai eholdei 1 i ia> not seek compensatory 
damages in addition to the appraisal remedy when his complaint boils down to nothing 
more than a complaint about stock price. Bingham Consol Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT 
App I 3 4 ? l | ^ .- - •;..-. • mis case. i>\ .u i.;,,. wwuu. ;»U ii m> amended 
derivative complaint on v \
 X.\W\ 12, 2008, 'f±u ^ '• *«• <-! 
its acquisition of NCEM and, as a practical and legal matter, Braun5 s requests for 
corrective disclosures, to block the transaction, and to rescind the transaction, were moot. 
Buyout Group's tender offer price of $13.37 per share — a price that 90% of NCEM's 
shareholders affirmatively accepted — was too low. Accordingly, the trial court did MO? 
: • a'i.i- • statutory npjr an 
appraisal of his shares. 
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude somehow that Braun preserved the 
issue. , his argui i lei it tl lat 1 lis claii ns at e dii ect (as opposed to derivative) is contrary to 
Utah law. A long line of Utah cases makes clear that where, as here, a plaintiff asserts 
claims for breach of duty against directors and officers of a corporation, yet fails to allege 
ai i ii I ji iry distinct I ron i that suffered by other shareholders collectively, his claims must be 
brought derivatively, consistent with the n lie s go\ en lii ig si icl I de rivati v e • claims 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Braun's Appeal Is Procedurally Flawed. 
As noted above, this appeal suffers from two fundamental procedural and 
jurisdictional defects, both of which mandate dismissal of the appeal or affirmance of the 
trial court's May 11, 2009 order of dismissal. 
A. Braun Does Not Challenge The May 11, 2009 Order Of Dismissal From 
Which He Is Appealing. 
The first fundamental flaw in this appeal is that Braun is not challenging the order 
from which he is appealing. Braun claims to be appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 
order dismissing his amended derivative complaint for lack of standing. (Appellant's Br. 
at 1, 14) Yet, Braun makes clear in his brief that he is not challenging the trial court's 
conclusion that the consummation of the Buyout Group's acquisition of NCEM on 
October 22, 2008 deprived Braun of standing to assert his purported derivative claims. 
(Appellant's Br. at 15 n.4 ("plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's ruling that 
completion of a merger eliminates derivative standing")) Thus, Braun concedes that the 
trial court did not err when it entered its May 11, 2009 order dismissing his amended 
derivative complaint. This concession alone eliminates any jurisdictional basis for this 
appeal. 
B. Braun's Attempt To Challenge The Trial Court's October 15, 2008 
Oral Comments From The Bench Is Improper. 
In reality, Braun is not appealing the trial court's May 11, 2009 order of dismissal 
at all. Rather, Braun is attempting to appeal from the trial court's preliminary oral 
remarks at the October 15, 2008 hearing on NCEM's motion to dismiss Braun's initial 
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complaint. In essence, Braun argues that the trial coin I was wrong win it il suggested a( 
the start of that hearing that it was inclined to agree with NCEM's argument that Braun's 
claims were derivative as opposed to direct. Indeed, Braun's first and principal argument 
in til lis appeal is tf lat ' tl te tit ial o :>i n I: z t i sd ii 1 :: 01 lcli iclii lg tl lat plaintiff s ::laii i is ai e 
derivative rather than direct." (See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 15-24) 
There are several fatal defects in this attempt by Braun to appeal from the trial 
coi n t's October 15 2008 pi elh i lii ial y oi al con n nei its F 'ii si, tl le ti ial coi irt never 
"concluded" that Braun's claims were derivative. To the contrary, the court made clear at 
the hearing that its comments reflected its "preliminary thinking" (R.l 167 u\ p ' \\ \l u n 
ecu lid "'certainly" change its i i lii id after Brai in presented argument t .n 
that it was not telling Braun's counsel that there was no v : • ' .,:. 
(R.l 167 at p. 17). Notwithstanding these additional comments from the trial court, Braun 
voluntarily withdrew his Complaint without presenting any argument. (F 1167 nt r 1 0) 
Accordingly; the i u idei l> ing n lotioi I to disi i liss becan ic i i loot, ai id tl i i ti ial • : c i n: t i le v ei 
rendered a "conclusion" or issued an order. In short, Braun's principal argument in this 
appeal rests on a false premise; it is based on a "conclusion" that the trial court nc\er 
reached. 
Second, even if the trial court's October 15, 2008 preliminary oral remarks 
somehow did amount to a "conclusion" that Braun's claims were derivative and not 
direct tlie\ still niiinnf provide :i \vtV\\< for llus appe.il "I'uv. a* lieie, Mie) never became 
the basis for a final, appealable order. Jones v. Taylor, 1999 UT App 304, para. 3, 
No. 990737, 1999 WL 33244736 (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Hah 
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1978)); see also Black v. Tadahara, 2009 UT App 83, para. 4-5, No. 20090334-CA, 2009 
WL 1912589 ("[A]n oral ruling is not an appealable order.").5 Here, the trial court's 
October 15, 2008 comments from the bench were rendered moot by Braun's subsequent 
decision to voluntarily withdraw his initial complaint and to file an amended derivative 
complaint instead. 
Third, plaintiff is, in effect, attempting in this appeal to resurrect the direct claims 
that he voluntarily withdrew in the trial court, and it is axiomatic that a party who 
voluntarily dismisses his complaint has no right to appeal that dismissal. See Barton v. 
Utah Transit Auth., 872 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Utah 1994) (citing United States v. Procter & 
5
 Utah is not alone in this regard. In re Honaker, No. 00AP-1269, 2001 WL 491893, 
*6-*7 (Ohio App. 2001) ("[A]ppellantfs assertion of error rests solely on statements 
by the trial court at the October 2000 hearing, which statements, appellant contends, 
shows that the trial court improperly found that appellant's conviction automatically 
warranted termination of appellant's parental rights . . . It is axiomatic, however, that a 
court speaks from its journal and not by oral pronouncement from the bench"); Do-
Wop Corp. v. City ofRahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (NJ 2001) ("[I]t is well-settled that 
appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from opinions, oral decisions, 
informal written decisions, or reasons given for the ultimate conclusion."); State of 
New Mexico v. Lohberger, 144 N.M. 297, 303 (NMSC 2008) ("While all of these 
items may have been evidentiary indicia of what the judge had intended to do or of 
what he might have said or reported on a given day, none of them constituted an 
actual appealable order."); Helmrick v. Helmrick, 95 Wis.2d 554, 556 (Wis. App. Ct. 
1980) ("An oral ruling must be reduced to writing and entered before an appeal can be 
taken from it."); Alberstadt v. Alberstadt, 257 Md. 552, 553 (Md. App. Ct. 1970) 
(parties cannot appeal "from comments by or the opinion of a lower court"); In re 
Estate of Lulu Pieper, 224 Cal.App.2d 670, 675 (Cal. App. 1964) (a party cannot 
appeal from what is "merely an announcement of the court's intended decision."); 
Rust v. Clark County Sck Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 689 (Nev. 1987) ("An oral 
pronouncement of judgment is not valid for any purpose, NRCP 58(c); therefore, only 
a written judgment has any effect, and only a written judgment may be appealed . . . 
Appellant. . . should have requested a written judgment from the district court."). 
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Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 680 (195b; Bowers i > .,.• U -0 . -
(8th Cir.1981); Yoffe v. Keller Indus., Inc., 580 F.2d 126, 129 p i h u . 1978);. Simnh 
put, having abandoned them below, Braun has no right to resuscitate his direct claims in 
this appeal. 
Braun cannot claim that this is unfair, since Braun himself made the strategic 
decision to withdraw his initial complaint and to replace it with his amended derivative 
Mijl coi irt was wrong when it stated during 
the October 15, 2008 hearing that it was inclined to agree \\» ith N CEM that Bi a/i m's 
claims were derivative and not direct, then Braun should I M have withdrawn his direct 
claims. Rather, the proper course would have been for Braun +o trv to convince the trial 
court that it was wrong ana, n u * ^ 
his direct claims. Braun, of course, did not do this. He never attempted to convince the 
trial court that his claims were direct, not derivative, and he never sought a ruling on 
NCEM's mnlinn In ihsiniss 111• I n n l ehiiins, \s <i ir.iill ilinc was never a mii Vt 
alone an order dismissing Braun's direct claims, from which Braun could appeal. 
Instead, Braun made the strategic decision v ^ ->hdnnv his direct claims and file 
derivative c1 >lace — «fni\ iitin1 damis lluil everyone,, even Braun, now 
agrees he lacked standing to bring once the Buyout Group completed its acquisition of 
NCEM, at which time Braun ceased to be a shareholder. Having voluntarily withdrawn 
f» .•- .--• :plain now. i Vt bottom, flu- JISI • ' l i i .aia's 
appeal is that he rode the wrong horse. But that is not a reason u ee. 
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For all of these reasons, Braun has no right to bring this appeal, and this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear it. 
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Holding In The Alternative That Braun's 
Exclusive Remedy Was To Exercise His Statutory Right to An Appraisal. 
Although it did not have to do so, the trial court also determined that, even if 
Braun had standing to bring his amended derivative complaint (which he did not), his 
exclusive remedy was to exercise his statutory right of appraisal. It was surely correct in 
doing so. 
This Court has recognized that "[i]n most jurisdictions, an appraisal proceeding is 
the sole remedy available to a shareholder dissenting to a merger." See Bingham, 2004 
UT App 434, TJ30; see also Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1302(5) (limiting dissenting 
shareholder to dissenter's rights, including appraisal remedy). This Court has also held 
that a dissenting shareholder may not seek compensatory damages in addition to this 
statutory appraisal remedy when his complaint boils down to nothing more than a 
complaint about stock price. See Bingham, 2004 UT App 434, f^ 33 (citing Szaloczi v. 
John R. Behrmann Revocable Trust, 90 P.3d 835, 840-42 (Colo. 2004) ("A dissenting 
shareholder may not seek compensatory damages in addition to the appraisal remedy 
when the complaint boils down to nothing more than a complaint about stock price.") 
(quotation omitted)). 
That is exactly this case. As noted above, Braun filed his amended derivative 
complaint on October 22, 2008 — the same day the Buyout Group completed its 
acquisition of NCEM. {See R.949; R. 1007-08) Intentionally or otherwise, Braun in this 
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ajipri • \ -.i/h*'. ' • i-i-r .*, \s - '.< . ;.. i m ui LIIL *.• isition 
had on his amended derivative complaint's claims for relief. Braun also forgets certain of 
his key representations to the trial court, regarding the nature oi - »•- uatms 
post-acqi lisitioi 1 
Specifically, Braun fails to recognize that the consummation of the acquisition 
rendered moot aily request in the amended derivative complaint for supplemental or 
corrective disclosures concerning the transactor \m--AM-»I.//- ,•< <<>; ies, 
Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 362 (Del. Ch. 2008) ("The merger has happened; the metaphorical 
merger eggs have been scrambled.' An injunctive order requiring supplemental, 
corrective disclosures at this stage wouu e an exercise v.- .i.Iity and frivolity 
in jury ^iH,^,! ;l - • • * • ^ -.niiL-nu -»i ,. ::.cu iignt to cast informed votes 
on the merger . . . [and] that injury is no longer redressable."). 
Similarly, Braun fails to acknowledge that the completion of the acquisition 
mooted 1 lis reqi lest foi ai I ii i ji n lctioi I b locking the ti ai isaction 1 Jeedless to say , once an 
acquisition occurs, blocking it from occurring is nu lunger an option. See In re Lukens 
Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 757 A.2d 720, 728 (Del. Ch. 1999) (after merger closes, 
"[m]one> damages [are] tl le oi i.I> possible foi it i I of i: elie f a/v ailable") 
Finally, Braun fails to recognize in his brief on appeal that, upon completion o f the 
acquisition, any claim for rescission of the transaction was utterly impractical and legally 
baseless. See McMillan v. Intercargo Coi j '., 768 \2A I 492 , 500 (T)c 1 CI i 2000) [i ti it * ; i 
merger has been consummated, "the metaphorical merger eggs have been scrambled," 
and "it is generally accepted that a completed merger cannot, as a practical matter, be 
unwound."); Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 831, 834 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("the practical 
difficulties of undoing purchases made by good faith purchasers for value on a national 
securities exchange lends additional weight to defendants' position" that rescission is 
impractical); RGC Intern. Investors, LDC v. Greka Energy Corp., No. Civ. A. 17674, 
2000 WL 1706728, at *16 n.59 (Del. Ch. 2000) (granting motion to dismiss claim for 
rescission of merger and noting "the general rule that it is impractical to unwind a 
consummated merger involving publicly traded corporations whose shares were held by 
numerous stockholders.").6 Indeed, Braun conceded as much below, when he 
represented the following to the trial court: 
Plaintiff realizes that his requested relief of rescission is no longer viable 
now that the Proposed Buyout has closed because of the difficulty in 
unscrambling the merger eggs. Thus, plaintiff intends to amend his 
complaint to seek a damage remedy. 
6 Braun's request for rescission in this case was particularly inappropriate, given his 
decision on October 15, 2008 to withdraw his motion to enjoin the acquisition before 
it was consummated on October 22, 2008. See In re LNR Property Corp. 
Shareholders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 179 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("Having allowed the merger 
to close without seeking an injunction, the plaintiffs cannot now seek . . . to rescind 
and set aside the merger"); In re J. P. Morgan Chase & Co. Shareholders Litig., 906 
A.2d 808, 825 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("[PJlaintiffs did not seek an injunction to stop the 
merger before it closed ... Now, of course, the 'eggs' have been irretrievably 
'scrambled' and there is no possibility of effective equitable relief."); Clements v. 
Rogers, 790 A.2d 1222, 1238 n.45 (Del. Ch. 2001) ("Clements did little to support her 
current litigation position by continuing to plead a rescission claim in her two 
complaints after she made a tactical decision not to seek to prevent the 
consummation of the merger.") (emphasis added); In re Lukens, 151 A.2d at 728 
("[Pjlaintiffs' demand for rescission of the transaction is plainly futile. Even 
disregarding plaintiffs' failure to pursue injunctive relief prior to the shareholder vote, 
although that option was readily available, it goes without saying that at this juncture 
it is "impossible to unscramble the eggs." Money damages being the only possible 
form of relief available ....") (emphasis in original). 
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(R I l l 71 it n K ) 
In short, because events had overtaken it, Braun's amended derivative complaint 
boiled down to nothing more than a complaint tl mt tl: ic Bi ry 01 it Gi oup* s tendei 3ffei pi ice 
of $13 37 per share w as too lo w, even though that price represented a 36% premium over 
the market price of NCEM's stock immediately before the tender offer, and even though 
the holders of more than 90°<> *>; \ . hM's shares readily accepted " '665 
967) Brai in adi i litted this below , it : c : - h = i I 1 ic • told tl i€ ti ial COLUL mat the ^tu* of 
[Braun's] allegations are now necessarily focused on unfair price." (R. 1116-1117 
(emphasis added)) 
A c c o r d i n g . Ilu lii.il i ' iiuhiuietl n u u ' c l h llnil Miami's CM lusive 
remedy was an appraisal of his shares, and that his amended derivative complaint should 
be dismissed. See Bingham, 2004 UT App 434, ^31 ("Appraisal is appropriate under 
such circumstances because it awards esse UJH . \v.v • <>>•{ 
avoids the danger of awarding duplicate damages that would otherwise result from a 
separate tort action for compensatory damages.'5); see also Weinstein v. Appelbaum, 193 
F.Supp.2d / /4 'Xll (S.D.N "Y li)i)l) (applying Delaware law) (A mnmrik slutefmldei * 
exclusn i n u , : ..-!'
 a p p r a i s a i "yields only to an exception where the stockholder 
properly alleges bad faith which goes beyond the issues of mere inadequacy of price") 
(internal quotation omitted); Green . .v,,, «,- /-t /•.(-.; 
1^)87) (saim:). 
Braun argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his derivative claims because 
the amended derivative complaint alleges unlawful acts in connection with the merger. 
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(Appellant's Br. at 25-30) In support of this argument, Braun relies heavily on this 
Court's decision in Bingham Consol Co. v. Groesbeck, but that case actually supports the 
trial court's ruling. In Bingham, the appellant challenged a trial court's consideration of 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in arriving at "fair value" within the context of an 
appraisal proceeding. See 2004 UT App 434, f 29-30. While Bingham recognized the 
fraud exception, it did not apply it, holding instead that the exception should not apply 
"when [a dissenting shareholder] claims, in essence, that the primary effect of the ... 
breach of fiduciary duty was to diminish share value." Id. at f^ 31. That is precisely the 
case here, as Braun himself concedes. (R.1117) ("the crux of his allegations are now 
necessarily focused on unfair price.") Under such circumstances — where "the primary 
effect" of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty "was to diminish share value" — Bingham 
makes clear that a plaintiff is "limited to the appraisal remedy." 2004 UT App 434 at 
131. 
Braun cites a Nevada case, Cohen v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., asserting that Cohen 
considered and rejected the contention that a plaintiff whose claims boil down to 
allegations of unfair price should be limited to an appraisal remedy. (Appellant's Br. at 
28) Cohen, of course, is not controlling. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Cohen 
involved direct rather than derivative claims. Indeed, the Cohen court applied the 
continuous ownership rule to dismiss all derivative claims by former shareholders, and 
only applied the fraud exception to the direct claims that survived. See 62 P.3d 720, 732 
(Nev. 2003) ("a former shareholder does not have standing to assert a derivative claim."). 
Under Cohen, then, Braun's derivative complaint was correctly dismissed in its entirety. 
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F i n a 1 - •» - - ! ' ^ ; 11> 
recognize an exception to the general rule that dissenters are bound to an appraisal 
proceeding whenever derivative claims allege fraud or breach ~f fiduciary duty. 
(Appellai it's Bi at 28 30) Bi it Bi ai in igi 101 es n lot e recent case law clarify ing tl le scope 
of this so-called "fraud exception" and making clear that it 01lly applies "[w]here the 
merger itself is the subject of a claim of fraud, being perpetrated merely to deprive 
shareholders of the standing to bi ii ig a derivative a d i - Lew ^ \ n
 !t/w A -. \.. <. - -<-• 
899 (Del. 2004). Ihere are no allegations in this case suggesting such a scenario. 
Indeed, it would be factually impossible, since Braun's original complaint was not filed 
until after the merger was already negotiated and publicly announced to shareholders, and 
his amet ided deri\ ative ecu i lplaii it was i lot I lied I intil se\ ei a! w eeks later, tl: le san le day 
the acquisition was completed. See Feldman v. Cutaia, 956 A.2d 644, 661 (Del. Cli, 
2007) (fraud exception did not apply where merger was "culmination of a two-year 
process, beginning ele\ ei 11 i lot ill: is 'be! bi: e [ plaii ltiff] filed tl lis la vv si lit ' ) 
At bottom, Braun's doomsday scenario — that "controlling shareholders . . . could 
engage in oppressive tactics in breach of their fiduciary duties, and then escape liability 
for • • •;legating r i lii IC :t: it> si iare 1: lolders ii ito an appraisal 
proceeding," (Appellant's Br. at 29) — simply is unfounded. To the extent that Braun or 
any other dissenting shareholder wanted to challenge the NCEM board's process for 
shopping the company, they wei e free to do so in ai i appi aisal proceeding. See Bingham, 
2004 UT App 434 at \"32 ("'I Tjhe court may consider evidence of breach of fiduciary 
duty in an appraisal to assess the credibility of [a] proposed valuation."); In re 
r/ 
Netsmart Tech.} Inc. Shareholders Litig, 924 A.2d 171, 210 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("In an 
appraisal, the failure of the Netsmart board to test the market for strategic buyers in an 
active way will have relevance."); Alabama-By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 
257 (Del. 1991) (affirming lower court's determination that "if corporate fiduciaries 
engage in self-dealing and fix the merger price by procedures not calculated to yield a 
fair price, these facts should, and will, be considered in assessing the credibility of the 
respondent corporations' valuation contentions" in the appraisal context) (quotations and 
citations omitted). 
In sum, the trial court correctly held in the alternative that Plaintiffs sole remedy 
is an appraisal proceeding, and its decision should therefore be affirmed. 
III. Braun's Breach-Of-Duty Claims Are Derivative, Not Direct. 
As noted above, Braun devotes most of his energies in this appeal to his initial 
complaint, and to the direct claims therein that he voluntarily withdrew in the trial court. 
This Court need not address those withdrawn claims in order to resolve this appeal, but if 
the Court is inclined to do so, it should reject Braun's argument that they were direct and 
not derivative. 
Utah law clearly states that a claim for breach of fiduciary duties by directors of a 
corporation belongs to the corporation, not to the individual shareholders, and that such a 
claim must be brought, if at all, as a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation. As 
Utah courts, including this Court, have repeatedly held, "claims of fiduciary breach" such 
as Braun's claims here "fall squarely in the category of claims that Utah law recognizes 
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as classically derivi itiv< \ " G F 1 ,P I it /. i \ CI Mgmt I tt L 2007 I J I A j )| > 131 1" 9, 163 I } 3d 
636; see also Dansie v. City ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, fflf 1344, 134 P.3d 1139. 
Braun relies on several Delaware cases in support of his argument that his claims 
are direct, rather than derivative ,IK-K isacruci.i' {: : >^
 : H, M\ 
and * • : • uforce breaches of fiduciary duties by corporate 
directors and, as such, Braun5s reliance on these Delaware cases is misplaced. (See, e.g., 
Appellant's Br. at 19-24) While Delaware courts appear to allow a direct actio!], at least 
ii i sen i: ic it istai ices, whei i. corporate directors bread i f idi iciai y di ities, I Jtah coi n ts I: lave 
expressly ruled that, except in the narrow instance of a closely held corporation, a direct 
action is not permitted because no individualized injury exists. 
I'u i . . i • •. • '',A«'v zom i " ; iiels C )1 1 P 2d 636 
(Utah 1980), stated that "[a]s a general rule, directors and other officers of a corporation 
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation." Id at 6"° Wl rile the plaintiff in 
Richardson claimed, like the plaintiff here, that corporate directors owe fidnr.iarv duties 
not- '<--. -. a aiso IU ••shareholder 0u ^ - •* i*"i --tated thai in uuui, it 
is clear that [a fiduciary] relation is to the stockholders collectively," as opposed to the 
individual shareholders. / ,nr i nun then noted that "[t]he distinction between a 
fid'* » II - ""' in- J- i^  a \ M"1 -• . . *i'ii '. ••u- stockholders 
collectively does not appear to be one of substance in this case," and found that "the 
claim for relief belongs to the corporation." Id, at 639 640, 1he Richardson court went 
on lei slate 
The rule in Utah is that mismanagement of the corporation 
gives rise to a cause of action in the corporation, even if the 
mismanagement results in damage to stockholders by 
depreciating the value of the corporation's stock. . . . 
Therefore, any compensatory damages which may be 
recovered on account of any breach by defendants of their 
fiduciary duty as directors and officers or arising as a result of 
mismanagement of the corporation by defendants belong to 
the corporation and not to the stockholders individually. 
Id. at 640. 
Subsequent rulings by the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have 
echoed the Richardson Court's statement that a breach of fiduciary duty claim belongs to 
the corporation, and not to the individual shareholder. In Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 
2000 UT 102, 20 P.3d 868, the Utah Supreme Court stated that u[c]laims of 
mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, and appropriation or waste of corporate 
opportunities are claims that the corporation has been injured. Accordingly, the cause of 
action belongs to the corporation and shareholders may sue only on its behalf." Id. at 
112. Similarly, in GFLP, Ltd. v. CL Mgrnt., Ltd, 2007 UT App 131, 163 P.2d 636, this 
Court found that a shareholder's "claims of fiduciary breach, excessive fees, 
commingling of fees, and mismanagement of property each fall squarely in the category 
of claims that Utah law recognizes as classically derivative. Id. at f^ 9 (emphasis added). 
These and other Utah cases make clear that, in order for a corporate shareholder to 
maintain a direct claim against corporate officers or directors, the shareholder "must 
show that he or she was injured in a manner distinct from the corporation." Warner, 
2000 UT 102, If 13. In GFLP, Ltd, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected a plaintiff 
shareholder's claim for injury distinct from that of the corporation when the shareholder's 
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c la in \ . : jiiiy was that it received reduced distributions from the corporation due to 
director misconduct. 20*07 LJ I App 1.31, "| : >^ GFLP court foi 11 id tl mt 1 he 
shareholder's injury of reduced distributions was linked \M -ne financial injury to the 
eorpoi alien ( „ni niii;: (in1 iedn< n) itishihuln is mill lli.il. therefore, the * hum belonged IM 
the corporation, not the shareholder. Id. Similarly, in Dansie, the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected a shareholder's claim of an injury distinct from the corporation when company 
insidei s t:t ansfei i: ed assets of tl le corporatioi I to tl lei i isel\ es to tl le detrin lei it :)f the 
remaining shareholders. 2006 UT 23, %% 11-14. fhe Court found that the "Plaintiffs 
claims [were] classically derivative: the value < r 'k- Company, aiid by extension 
Plaintiffs5 shares iii it, was diminished die transfer M M;. Company 's assets to the 
City. Plaintiffs were injured because the Company was injured." Id. at % 13. 
Braun's claim here is precisely the same as the claims of the plaintiffs in the 
aforementioned cases and, as in those cases, must be broiiglit as a derivative claim. 
Brai u l suffered froi i i tl lat :)f otl lei si lai: el lolders of tl ite corpoi ation. His 
central allegation in this case is that the directors of Nevada Chemicals did not disclose 
adequate information and did not secure a sufficient price for the Company. Braun 
claii ns, essentiall} , tl lat the directors 1 lad a cli lty • :>f greater" disclosi ire at id a di it> to 
negotiate a higher price, but he does not and cannot claim how those duties were owed to 
him separately from other shareholders. Any entitlement to disclosure would apply to all 
allegedly inadequate price, such an injur- is no different than th^ :niiir\ i urportedly 
suffered by all shareholders (even those who affirmatively tendered their shares in 
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response to the Buyout Group's offer). Accordingly, Braun's claim of injury, like the 
plaintiffs claim in GFLP, Ltd., is tied to the collective shareholder or corporate injury 
and must be brought as a derivative claim. 
In sum, if the trial court had ruled that Plaintiffs claims were derivative (which it 
did not), that ruling would have been correct, and there was no error below. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated herein, Braun's appeal from the trial court's May 11, 
2009 01 dei* dismissii ig his ai nei idled dei iv ative coi nplaii it foi lac k :d jurisdictioi i lacks 
merit, and the trial court's order should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^ H & y of December 2009 
By: 
PARR BRCW% GEE & LOVELESS, PC 
Robert S/ClaVk 
Stephen^, wj. Hale 
Jenifer L. Tdmchak 
and 
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 
John F. Hartmann 
Michael A. Duffy 
Daniel C. Moore 
Attorneys for Appellees Nevada Chemicals Inc., 
Oaktree Capital Management, L.P., Calypso 
Acquisition Corp., Cyanco Holding Corp., and 
OCMPrincipal Opportunities Fund IV, L P. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IRVING S. BRAUN, Derivatively On Behalf 
of NEVADA CHEMICALS INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
E. BRYAN BAGLEY, NATHAN L. WADE, 
JOHN T. DAY, JAMES E. SOLOMON, M. 
GARFIELD COOK, OAKTREE CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT, L.P., CALYPSO 
ACQUISITION CORP., CYANCO 
HOLDING CORP., and OCM PRINCIPAL 
OPPORTUNITIES FUND IV, L.P., 
Defendants, 
and 
NEVADA CHEMICALS INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Nominal Party. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 080919636 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
FILED 01 STRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
p. warn aw 
Deputy Clerk 
290081 
On April 24, 2009, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Derivative 
Complaint came on for hearing. Stephen E. W. Hale, Jenifer L. Tomchak, and Daniel Moore 
appeared on behalf of Defendants Oaktree Capital Management, L.P., Calypso Acquisition 
Corp., Cyanco Holding Corp., OCM Principal Opportunities Fund IV, L.P., and Nominal 
Defendant Nevada Chemicals, Inc.; Mark F. James appeared on behalf of the individual 
Defendants, former directors of Nevada Chemicals, Inc.; and David T. Wissbroecker and 
Heather M. Sneddon appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Irving S. Braun. The Court, having 
reviewed the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Derivative Complaint and 
supporting papers and those in opposition thereto, having heard and considered the cirguments by 
the parties on that Motion, having reviewed the documents and pleadings on file in this matter, 
and determined that good cause is shown, the Court finds that: 
(A) Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a derivative action inasmuch as he is no longer a 
shareholder of Nevada Chemicals, Inc., and therefore does not fairly and adequately represent 
the interests of the shareholders, and 
(B) Plaintiffs remedy for the claims alleged in the Amended Derivative Complaint is 
to exercise his statutory right to an appraisal of his shares as provided by Utah law; 
THE COURT, THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as 
follows: 
1. Defendants' Motion shall be and hereby is GRANTED; 
290081 2 
2. All claims that were or could have been asserted by Plaintiff Irving S. Braun in 
the Amended Derivative Complaint in the above captioned lawsuit are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice upon the merits. 
DATED this J j _ day of. Wk&M 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
C*S>^Xsyj?U+y^ 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
Third Judicial District Court 
29008J 3 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Jon V. Harper (#1378) 
Heather M. Sneddon (#9520) 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 801/534-1700 
801/364-7697 (fax) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[Additional counsel appear on signature page.] 
*ii £S DISTRICT COURT 
OCT 'I 3 2008 
SAL) LA££ *"<• I N f V 
By 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IRVING S. BRAUN, Individually and On 
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEVADA CHEMICALS INC., E. BRYAN 
BAGLEY, NATHAN L. WADE, JOHN T. 
DAY, JAMES E. SOLOMON, M. GARFIELD 
COOK, OAKTREE CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT, L.P., CALYPSO 
ACQUISITION CORP., CYANCO 
HOLDING CORP. and OCM PRINCIPAL 
OPPORTUNITIES FUND IV, L.P., 
ORDER 
Civil No. 080919636 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on October 15, 2008, at 9:00 a,m. before the 
Honorable Sandra Peuler for a hearing on Defendant Nevada Chemicals' Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint; Plaintiff Irving S. Braun's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Plaintiffs Motion 
for Reconsideration of His Request for Expedited Discovery. Plaintiff was represented by David 
T. Wissbroecker of Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins, LLP, and Heather M. Sneddon of 
Anderson & Karrenberg, P.C. Defendant Nevada Chemicals, Inc., was represented by Stephen 
E. W. Hale of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. Defendants Nathan L. Wade, John T. 
Day, James E. Solomon and M. Garfield Cook were represented by Mark F. James of Hatch, 
James & Dodge, P.C. Defendant E. Bryan Bagley was represented by Jefferson W. Gross of 
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross. Defendants Oaktree Capital Management, LP, Calypso Acquisition 
Corp., Cyanco Holding Corp., and OCM Principal Opportunities Fund IV, L.P., were represented 
by John F. Hartmann of Kirkland Ellis LLP, and Christopher B. Sullivan of Howrey LLP. 
Plaintiffs counsel had informed respective counsel for Defendants the afternoon prior to 
the hearing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction that Plaintiff did not intend to proceed with 
the hearing on October 15, 2008, and, at the October 15, 2008, hearing, Plaintiff formally 
withdrew his Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Accordingly, based upon the documents on file 
with the Court and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND 
DECREES as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of His Request for Expedited Discovery is 
denied. 
2. Based upon Defendants' stipulation, Plaintiff shall file an amended derivative 
complaint with the Court no later than October 22, 2008. The amended derivative complaint 
2 
may include allegations and claims in addition to those set forth in the proposed amended 
complaint already submitted to the Court. Defendants are permitted to lodge any objections they 
may have to Plaintiffs new amended derivative complaint to the extent the new amended 
derivative complaint includes allegations and claims in addition to those set forth in the proposed 
amended complaint already submitted to the Court. 
3. Based upon the foregoing, Defendant Nevada Chemicals5 Motion to Dismiss 
Complaint is moot. 
Dated this ^ day of Q - o h ; 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tflfc 
< ^ w / - ^ y 
fe Honorable Sandra Peki] 
Third District Court Judged 
6\1L\ 
Approved as to form: ( $\/M*\ \?V \\tK\hw ^v\<:\Aoyi vufU vw>tf-^ QyAk\u>Y\~z«-ViOV\ 
hhnA S) CW\^ 
Stephen E. W. Hale 
Attorney for Defendant Nevada Chemicals, 
Inc. 
\U$*i*VV\ W. Q\v*<> 
Jefferson W. Gross 
Attorney for Defendant E. Bryan Bagley 
j l W ¥. ±JM^H*A<ir^ 
John F. Hartmann 
Christopher B. Sullivan 
Attorneys for Defendants Oaktree Capital 
Management, L.P., Calypso Acquisition Corp., 
Cyanco Holding Corp. and OCM Principal 
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Attorneys for Defendants Nathan L. Wade, 
John T Day, James E. Solomon andM. 
Garfield Cook 
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HEARING 
This case comes before the Court for a hearing on the defendants' 
motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary 
injunction. Appearances as shown. 
The matter is argued to the Court by respective counsel and the 
Court ORDERS: 
1. A stipulation is reached that the plaintiff can amend the 
complaint. The plaintiff is given one week to do this. 
2. The defendant reserves the right to further object Lo the 
amended complaint. 
3. The plaintiff withdraws their motion for a preliminary 
injunction. 
Mr. Wissbroecker to prepare the order. 
Page 1 (last) 
qxz 
^> iv^ <^>&- —cr cv~)--3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IRVING S. BRAUN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
E. BRYAN BAGLEY, et al., 
Defendants, 
-and-
NEVADA CHEMICALS, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
Case No. 080919636 
Appellate Case No. 20090493 
With Keyword Index 
MOTION HEARING OCTOBER 15,2008 
BEFORE 
JUDGE SANDRA PEULER 
HUB DISTRICT F « T 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 11 2CS9 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
"deputy CledT 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
, la v©£ 
Mai 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: DAVID WISSBROECKER 
HEATHER M. SNEDDON 
Attorney at Law 
For the Defendants: 
Other parties: 
STEPHEN E. HALE 
JEFFERSON W. GROSS 
JENIFER L.TOMCHAK 
Attorneys at Law 
MARK JAMES 
JOHN HARTMAN 
CHRISTOPHER B. SULLIVAN 
Attorneys at Law 
* * * 
ORAL ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Hale 
Mr. Gross 
Mr. Wissbroecker 
INDEX 
Page 
6,18,20 
18 
2,15 
STIPULATION 14,18 
RULING 20 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; OCTOBER 15, 2008 
2 JUDGE SANDRA PEULER 
3 (Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Good morning. Let me note that we are 
7 on the record. The matter before the Court this morning is 
8 Braun vs. Nevada Chemicals. The case number is 080919636. 
9 And may I ask counsel to please state your appearances for 
10 the record? 
11 MS. SNEDDON: Your Honor, Heather Sneddon and David 
12 Wissbroecker for the plaintiff. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. 
14 MR. HALE: Steve Hale on behalf of the defendant, 
15 Nevada Chemicals, Inc. 
16 MR. JAMES: Mark James, Your Honor, on behalf of 
17 four of the defendant directors. 
18 MR. GROSS: Jefferson Gross on behalf of Defendant 
19 Bagley. 
20 MR. HARTMAN: Your Honor, John Hartman and behind 
21 me Chris Sullivan for the buyer group defendants who are 
22 Oaktree Capital Management LC,; Calypso Acquisition Corp., 
23 Cyanco Holding Corp, and OCM Principal Opportunities Fund for 
24 LT. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you very much for your 
1 appearances. Tell me what's happening this morning. I got 
2 some messages yesterday afternoon. 
3 MR. WISSBROECKER: Your Honor, David Wissbroecker 
4 for the plaintiff. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. 
6 MR. WISSBROECKER: As the Court is aware, we had 
7 the preliminary injunction hearing scheduled for today and we 
8 were hoping to be able to secure additional documents in 
9 advance of that, so that's why we filed the Motion for 
10 Reconsideration last Thursday when it became clear that we 
11 were not going to have access to the internal company 
12 documents. We determined that it would be not practical to 
13 be able to cross examine the witnesses without those 
14 documents available, and so we determined that we did not 
15 want to go forward with the preliminary injunction hearing 
16 today. We informed defendants of that. 
17 We - I think sometime around 2:30 is when we began 
18 discussions to let them know that, you know, people that were 
19 out of town didn't have to travel because we weren't going to 
20 go forward with the evidentiary hearing on the preliminary 
21 injunction hearing. 
22 So what we would like the Court to do though today, 
23 is to reconsider, or to grant our Motion for Reconsideration 
24 and allow us access to those documents that - and we could be 
25 able to present the Court with an evidentiary basis for the 
1 preliminary injunction motion. And we presented the Court 
2 with briefing citing to some federal case law on Rule 26, 
3 which Utah courts have held should be read to help interpret 
4 the Utah rules when there's no case law on point in Utah. 
5 And the rules - as the advisory committee notes, 
6 the cases that apply in those notes demonstrate that when the 
7 circumstances are exigent, when there's, you know, a brief 
8 period of time that plaintiffs can seek relief from the 
9 court, injunctive relief, that in those circumstances it is 
10 appropriate for the Court to grant expedited discovery and 
11 good cause exists in those circumstances. 
12 The Mirave (phonetic) case is the one that we cited 
13 in the papers that's pretty much right on point. It's a 
14 tender offer. The Court relying on those advisory committee 
15 notes and, you know, existing case law said, it's not as 
16 defendants suggest, a fishing expedition. It's a problem of 
17 proof. 
18 When you're on a preliminary injunction motion, as 
19 the Court's aware, there's a burden to demonstrate 
20 entitlement success on the merits that requires evidence and 
21 in those circumstances the Courts have agreed that parties 
22 should be allowed access to those expedited discovery 
23 documents. 
24 And we would think that are reviewing these 
25 submissions that defendants gave the Court yesterday, their 
1 motion, or their opposition to our motion for a preliminary 
2 injunction hearing, we think that demonstrates further the 
3 information that we're alleging exists does exist. And a 
4 number of those items that we suggested to the Court were 
5 material details, material information that needed to be 
6 disclosed before the tender offer closed. 
7 The defendant has identified a number cf those 
8 factual details in the papers yesterday. And although those 
9 are unsupported, they didn't present the evidence. We think 
10 that demonstrates clearly that the evidence exists, and it's 
11 in their possession, and that if the Court would permit us to 
12 have access to that evidence, that we could present an 
13 evidentiary basis for the relief we're seeking. 
14 And we ask the Court for even a more narrow subset. 
15 We ask for just the board books and the board minutes, which 
16 would include the analysis of the financial advisor. And we 
17 have the statements that defendants made in their opposition 
18 to preliminary injunction to the effect of that there was an 
19 analysis of special dividend and the networking capital 
20 requirement. That information was there. There was 
21 information about the price that was paid for the other half 
22 of the joint venture. Defendants have stated they don't know 
23 that, because they're denied access to that information by an 
24 agreement between Oaktree and Avonic. 
25 Our view would be that that's material information 
and we would like to get the access to those documents to 
present that information to the Court. We informed 
defendants that we're not intending to proceed with the 
preliminary injunction today. So I'm not asking the Court to 
grant that, and I don't want to be, you know, the defendants 
to say that I've misrepresented what our position was because 
that's - it was our position we took yesterday with 
defendants is the position we're taking today. 
But we think that if given access to those 
documents we could come back before the Court in very short 
order and we would be asking for even a narrower set of 
relief given the exigencies, just the disclosure of the 
information, not getting into the process details, and there 
would be a decision for the Court to make. The standard is 
whether or not - it's an objective standard, whether or not a 
reasonable investor would consider that information material 
to the determination of, you know, how to tender their shares 
or to seek appraisal. 
And we think that's a determination the Court could 
make at a fairly concise factual record if we proceeded on an 
injunction remedy that was just on the basis of disclosures. 
I would suggest that it would not even be necessary to have 
live witnesses. It would be just a determination of the 
documents themselves and whether or not the information 
contained in those documents, which would be presented to the 
1 Court, is material information that should be disclosed. 
2 And for that reason, we think it's important that 
3 the Court address our Motion for Reconsideration even though 
4 we're not prepared to go forward on the existing record with 
5 the preliminary injunction motion. And that's the position 
6 we take today. 
7 THE COURT: Can I just ask, did you anticipate 
8 today that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss would be heard? 
9 MR. WISSBROECKER: We were informed, and we had 
10 discussions with the defendant - now I'm not going to hold 
11 them to this because they may, you know, want to still get 
12 this heard on an expedited basis, but we were informed that 
13 they did not want to go forward, that they were not prepared 
14 to go forward with that today. We had some discussions about 
15 the defendants stipulating to allowing an amendment. And we 
16 would, you know, put things off, and then they would have the 
17 opportunity to move to dismiss an amended complaint, which 
18 makes sense, because they've just moved to dismiss on legal 
19 issues, and it might result in seriatim briefing of motions 
20 to dismiss based on factual legal issues. And that was the 
21 discussion that we had. I'll let them make whatever - inform 
22 the Court of whatever their position is on that. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 
24 MR. HALE: Your Honor, this is a case where Mr. 
25 Braun, as we've just recently learned, holds 200 shares out 
1 of over seven million shares of Nevada Chemicals stock and he 
2 is trying to hold hostage a deal that would allow the 
3 shareholders to have a 36 percent premium over the last day 
4 trading before the deal was made public. And they filed the 
5 lawsuit, and I have learned recently much about 14-D-9 
6 disclosures by the SEC, and I'm sure you have been exposed to 
7 that as well. 
8 They filed their lawsuit a week before that 
9 disclosure even showed up. And we've done some of our own 
10 discovery outside of the normal formalities and discovered 
11 that Mr. Braun does this for a living. If we were allowed to 
12 go forward with the preliminary injunction hearing today, we 
13 would have shown that that is something that he engages in 
14 frequently, and he knows and should have known that the 
15 14-D-9 was a disclosure that was about to be filed and hadn't 
16 been filed when he filed the lawsuit. 
17 This is a strike lawsuit, Your Honor. And Mr. 
18 Braun asked for expedited discovery to begin with and we came 
19 to your chambers, as you recall, and we talked about whether 
20 that should be the case or not. And he - and you instructed 
21 him to file a motion for a preliminary injunction, and deal 
22 with the irreparable harm in that respect. 
23 We had a Motion to Dismiss on file that has now 
24 been fully briefed that is dispositive of the issue that is 
25 before the Court at this point in time. 
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stop, s 
There are a number 
In order to disable 
stop moving. And 
of moving part 
this machine, 
it seems ; to me that 
s, 
we 
and they 
need them 
this matter 
keep 
to 
ought 
to proceed in an orderly manner. They had their shot at 
being able to have discovery. We flew in - they subpoenaed 
all of the directors, and they subpoenaed the CFO. And all 
of them, Your Honor, were ready to come to testify today. 
We flew out Mr. Seth VanVorhees from the east coast 
in New Jersey, and he was with us yesterday morning. We 
spent the day preparing him to come and testify and explain. 
He's the company's investment advisor. He was going to 
explain and respond to the allegations that have been made in 
this complaint. We also flew out Mr. Hence, who was the 
author of the Kristen Berry report that the plaintiff 
complains he doesn't have the information necessary to make a 
decision about whether to sell his shares and offer them in 
response to the tender offer, or to hold on to his shares. 
All of these people, Your Honor, were prepared to 
come and testify. And Mr. Braun could have examined any one 
of those witnesses. And let me give you just one example. 
One of Mr. Braun's complaints in this action is that Nevada 
Chemicals failed to disclose what Oaktree Capital paid to 
Cyplus (phonetic), to buy Cyplus' interest in Cyanco. And 
are you familiar with - that they failed to disclose that. 
If the witnesses had been allowed to testify, and 
1 if counsel had asked them the question, the answer would have 
2 been, as we said in our opposition to their Motion for 
3 Preliminary Injunction, the reason it wasn't disclosed is 
4 there's a confidentiality agreement, and we don't know what 
5 was paid. It's that simple. And those kinds of questions, 
6 Your Honor, could have been asked today if we'd gone forward 
7 with the preliminary injunction. 
8 And Mr. Braun could have evaluated for himself the 
9 information that he complains that he doesn't have. The 
10 information that Kristen Berry used and relied upon, he could 
11 have examined the witness today and found out what Kristen 
12 Berry relied upon in connection with giving their fairness 
13 opinion, which, as you know, Your Honor, they opined that the 
14 $13.37 was a fair price for the shareholders. And if we were 
15 allowed to go forward and have the CFO of Nevada Chemicals 
16 testify, he would have said he'd gone through all the history 
17 of what this stock had traded at over the last decade, and it 
18 has never traded in excess of $13.37. 
19 And I think the Court can take judicial notice -
20 maybe you do or don't have a 401K, but everybody in America 
21 has lost — 
22 THE COURT: - take that information. 
23 MR. HALE: Everybody has lost in the last four 
24 weeks. And Mr. Braun marches into this Court with 200 shares 
25 and says, one, I want to hurry up and get expedited discovery 
1 and gets told, no, let's have a preliminary injunction. Then 
2 he says, oh, I don't want to do it today, when he could have 
3 asked the questions today and gotten the information. 
4 Then he does something that's unique. He opposes 
5 our Motion to Dismiss by attaching a Motion for Leave of 
6 Court to Amend his complaint. I don't know whether that 
7 motion has been filed with the court or not, but he attaches 
8 it, arguing as a subsidiary argument to the Motion to Dismiss 
9 that if you're going to claim it's a derivative claim then, 
10 you know, here's my amended complaint to satisfy the 
11 deficiencies in his pleadings. 
12 We find out, Your Honor, I had asked the Court 
13 let's identify witnesses two days in advance so everybody can 
14 get prepared and exchange exhibits and we did. And Mr. 
15 Gross, who represents one of the directors, specifically 
16 asked if Mr. Braun was going to show up at the hearing on 
17 Monday. And it turns out that Mr. Braun wasn't going to show 
18 up today, never planned to show up for the hearing today, and 
19 I'm sensitive to the reasons why that were explained to us. 
20 He had religious observances that prohibited him. But Mr. 
21 Braun knew about that matter when this matter got set for a 
22 preliminary injunction hearing. And he should have scheduled 
23 it at another time so that he could show up. 
24 Your Honor, this is the third time we've been in 
25 front of you for expedited matters. And it seems to me that 
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1 it's time to let this lawsuit take its course. We ought to -
2 if the plaintiff is going to amend the complaint, let's have 
3 that stipulation that the complaint is going to be amended 
4 and then we will deal in due course with whether that is a 
5 legitimate claim or not. If they're not going to file their 
6 amended complaint, then I think we need to deal with the 
7 Motion to Dismiss, because if you grant the Motion to 
8 Dismiss, we all go home and then they can file later on 
9 whatever it is they think they need to file. 
10 But there's no sense in leaving that moving part 
11 continuing to move. Either he ought to stipulate today, 
12 right now, that they're going to file an amended complaint, 
13 and we will consent to it, or if they're not going to file 
14 it, then let's have the Motion to Dismiss decided. 
15 Number two, with respect to the request for 
16 expedited discovery, again, number one, there is the Motion 
17 to Dismiss and even if we decide that they're going to amend 
18 their complaint, there will be another Motion to Dismiss. So 
19 there is no reason, Your Honor, for the defendants, who have 
20 gone through tremendous expense in attorney's fees and flying 
21 people from back east to this court where they had the 
22 opportunity to take a free shot and there's not a better 
23 place to take a free shot at discovery than at a preliminary 
24 injunction hearing. 
25 J And so I think with all due respect, that if we're 
11 
1 going to proceed with this lawsuit that it ought to go in the 
2 normal course so that parties, in particular the defendants, 
3 are not continuing to incur the tremendous expense and the 
4 uncertainty about what's going on. So I guess what I'd ask 
5 the Court, I know this is sort of unusual, is to ask counsel, 
6 are you going to amend your complaint or not? 
7 THE COURT: Well, let me - could I give you sort of 
8 my take on this that I was thinking about before you all came 
9 this morning? I mean - and admittedly, I've not heard 
10 arguments on any of the substantive issues, but this is where 
11 my thinking is going after I read everything yesterday. I 
12 think number one, that the Motion to Dismiss is well taken. 
13 I think that the claim, if it's going to be brought, must be 
14 brought as a derivative action. So if I were to hear 
15 argument, and unless someone changed my mind for me this 
16 morning, which certainly could happen, I would be inclined to 
17 grant the Motion to Dismiss. 
18 So the next step in there is, there was a motion to 
19 file an amended complaint seeking a derivative claim, which 
20 has not been responded to but is on file. It seems to me, 
21 and I was looking for the section and I couldn't put my hands 
22 on it because I don't usually use these books, but in order 
23 to survive a Motion to Dismiss the derivative complaint, the 
24 plaintiff must meet all the requirements of the statute, 
25 which include the notice, and I can't remember, I think it's 
12 
1 a 90-day waiting period -
2 MR. HALE: That's correct. 
3 THE COURT: — or notice period. In order to 
4 survive a Motion to Dismiss, I believe that the plaintiff 
5 would then have to demonstrate irreparable harm if they had 
6 to wait that period of time, which gets us back to the 
7 irreparable harm issue, which I think, based upon the 
8 briefing that I read, is a legal argument. I don't know what 
9 might be briefed at that point, but just looking at what had 
10 already been briefed, it didn't seem to me that there were 
11 factual disputes, but there were arguments about the law to 
12 be applied to determine whether or not the plaintiff would 
13 suffer irreparable harm. 
14 So that's where I think we'd end up. And I admit 
15 it's kind of circular, but that was my thinking. And if the 
16 plaintiffs could then demonstrate that and survive a Motion 
17 to Dismiss, then at that point, I think I would be inclined 
18 to order some expedited discovery. 
19 I don't know that we're there yet, because the 
20 Motion to File and Amended Complaint, and certainly if it's 
21 stipulated to, great, has not been responded to and, you 
22 know, there hasn't been irreparable harm established, at 
23 least in terms of my finding in this court. Does that make 
24 any sense to anybody? 
25 MR. HALE: What you're saying makes sense. It may 
13 
1 make sense for us to caucus for a minute. I've got lots of — 
2 THE COURT: Oh, I understand that and I haven't 
3 heard from them and I'm sure they want to be heard, and I'm 
4 sure the plaintiff wants to respond to what I've said as 
5 well. That's just kind of my preliminary thinking. 
6 MR. HALE: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: Do you want me to leave the room? 
8 MR. HALE: We can walk out in the hall. You don't 
9 have to leave the room. 
10 THE COURT: All right. 
11 MR. HALE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: I'm just going to ask Kathy to stay on 
13 the record *cause it takes us a while to get back on. So 
14 we'll be on the record, but you all are welcome to leave and 
15 talk. 
16 MR. HALE: Thank you. 
17 (Pause in proceedings). 
18 THE COURT: We're still on the record. I took the 
19 opportunity to get some coffee while you were guys were 
20 caucusing. So thank you very much for that opportunity. So 
21 where are we after you've had a chance to talk to everybody? 
22 MR. HALE: Defense counsel's conferred and would 
23 consent to the stipulation of amending the complaint and 
24 filing the amended complaint. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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1 MR. WISSBROECKER: Your Honor, I'll try to be as 
2 brief as I can. I don't want to drag this on. 
3 THE COURT: Certainly. 
4 MR. WISSBROECKER: Plaintiff's position is this: is 
5 that if the Court wants to go forward with hearing the Motion 
6 to Dismiss, we believe that we should have the opportunity to 
7 argue briefly. It's a legal issue. I don't think that it's 
8 an overly long argument, but, you know, if the Court is 
9 inclined to grant the motion and determine the case is direct 
10 ~ or derivative as opposed to direct, we'd like the 
11 opportunity to present argument to the Court on that issue 
12 before the Court makes that determination. Going down the -
13 THE COURT: I apologize for interrupting. Do you 
14 not simply want to file your amended complaint to which the 
15 defendants have agreed? 
16 MR. WISSBROECKER: We - well, in the event the 
17 Court grants the Motion to Dismiss, we would ask, you know, 
18 that it be without prejudice, and that we'd be allowed the 
19 opportunity to file the complaint which would be a derivative 
20 complaint. And we understand the defendants are ready to 
21 stipulate to the filing of that complaint. 
22 We would also, however, ask the Court for an 
23 opportunity to not file the one that we submitted to the 
24 Court in connection with our preliminary injunction briefing. 
25 We would ask the Court for the opportunity to take a week, 
15 
1 maybe, you know, Monday even, a few days to be able to amend 
2 that because of the new information that has been disclosed 
3 to the Court by defendants regarding the information that the 
4 company does have about the merger, that they did not 
5 disclose to shareholders including, you know, some of the 
6 negotiations, the value of the - the issues I identified 
7 earlier, the networking capital and those issues. 
8 We think that we should have the opportunity to add 
9 that, because - and the Court is spot on in understanding the 
10 issue of irreparable harm and how it's kind of circular. And 
11 we, you know, we tried to explain that to the Court in our 
12 papers too. And if the Court is going to eventually, and the 
13 Court will eventually hear the Motion to Dismiss the 
14 derivative complaint, this Court acknowledges the issue is 
15 going to be irreparable harm, whether or not that is a 
16 permissible - is permissible for us to file a complaint. 
17 Now, we've given the Court the law on the issue of 
18 irreparable harm, and we think in the context of at least as 
19 far as the alleged non-disclosures go and the breach of the 
20 duty of disclosure, the issue is whether or not the 
21 information is material that wasn't disclosed. If it is 
22 material, then the case law says irreparable harm exists, per 
23 se. 
24 THE COURT: Well, but wait. But before we start to 
25 argue that issue — 
16 
1 MR. WISSBROECKER: Sure. Yeah. I sorry. 
2 THE COURT: I'm still not quite understanding. Do you not 
3 want to file the amended complaint? I mean, I guess, I've 
4 told you what I thought about the Motion to Dismiss, and 
5 that's without argument certainly, and you're welcome to 
6 argue that if you don't want to stipulate to the filing of 
7 the amended complaint. But - does that make sense? If you 
8 want to file the amended complaint, I'm not sure why we need 
9 to hear the Motion to Dismiss. 
10 MR. WISSBROECKER: Well, you know, as we tried to 
11 make clear in our papers, is that wanting to file the amended 
12 complaint would fall on the heels of the Court granting - in 
13 the event that the Court determined that our claims should 
14 have been brought direct. And that's why we offered, you 
15 know, as a proposed amendment and went through and did the 
16 analysis about why we think that that complaint would satisfy 
17 the requirements for the filing of the derivative lawsuit. 
18 THE COURT: If you want to waive oral argument, 
19 I'll rule right now. 
20 MR. WISSBROECKER: Well, I would appreciate the 
21 opportunity to explain quickly why we think that the claims 
22 are derived, but if the Court is telling us that there's no 
23 way you're going to change your mind, then — 
24 THE COURT: I'm not telling you that. I would 
25 J never do that. But let me hear - I think Mr. Hale has been 
17 
1 standing up a couple of times. 
2 MR. HALE: I'm sorry. I just want to say that if 
3 he wants to go forward with the Motion to Dismiss, we have 
4 tried to expedite this process by stipulating to it. If he 
5 wants to go forward with arguing the Motion to Dismiss, we 
6 withdraw our stipulation, and we'll just go through the 
7 normal course of litigation and file your Motion for Leave to 
8 Amend if you grant the motion, and we'll deal with it that 
9 way. What we're trying to do is short circuit all that, 
10 which accommodates him, which he's asked to have all us 
11 accommodate his schedule over the last three weeks. And 
12 we're trying to do it again and he's not accepted the offer, 
13 and we'll withdraw it. We can argue the Motion to Dismiss. 
14 We'll just deal with the fallout from that. 
15 THE COURT: Mr. Gross? 
16 MR. GROSS: Can I make one observation? We, I 
17 think, wasted a lot of the Court's time, a lot of the 
18 resources of the parties gearing this up. And what I just 
19 heard was, let's argue a motion which we don't really need to 
20 argue because he wants to file an amended complaint. I think 
21 it ought to be one or the other. If he wants to go ahead and 
22 tee this up, have oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss and 
23 it's granted, it ought to be with prejudice. On the other 
24 hand, if he wants to have another operative complaint that is 
25 going to be the subject of this litigation, then we ought to 
18 
1 get it on file. But I think enough time has been wasted on 
2 matters to date. And I think it's - we'd just be doing it 
3 again, arguing this Motion to Dismiss, if all they want to do 
4 is file an amended complaint. 
5 THE COURT: What do you want to do? 
6 MR. WISSBROECKER: Well, I think I'm intelligent 
7 enough to see that the tide is rolling against me on this 
8 issue. So we would - we'll enter the stipulation to file an 
9 amended complaint. We just request some additional time to 
10 amend that further and present the Court with an amended 
11 derivative complaint. And we can do that - we would ask for 
12 seven days, but we can do it on short time frame, 
13 Here's the issue, is that if the Court is not going 
14 - if we're not going to be able to get access to the evidence 
15 which we believe is necessary to support the motion for a 
16 preliminary injunction, then to a certain extent, the 
17 exigencies associated with briefing the Motion to Dismiss are 
18 not as present as they were before because the tender offer 
19 is going to close, in theory, as long as it's not extended on 
20 Friday. So we think that given the fact that the timing is 
21 not as tight a schedule, then we'd just ask for a few days to 
22 submit to the Court with another amended complaint. 
23 THE COURT: Well, and as I said earlier, I think 
24 that - and I think that the issue of expedited discovery in 
25 my mind goes along with a complaint that will survive a 
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That's just my explanation, for the benefit of all 
of you. But here's what I will do, based upon stipulation of 
counsel, plaintiff may file an amended complaint as a 
derivative action. He may have a week within which to do so 
reserving in the right of defendants, however, their right to 
further object because they looked at the proposed complaint 
that was on file. And in fairness, I shouldn't be granting a 
Motion to File an Amended complaint without everybody having 
had a chance to look at the proposed amended complaint. And 
I understand that. So, I'm going to give plaintiff an 
opportunity to kind of refine their amended complaint, and it 
will be filed. But if any counsel wishes to address anything 
that - any causes of action or otherwise that are in there 
that they didn't have an opportunity to do before, I'll give 
them that opportunity. Does that make sense? 
Okay. Mr. Hale? 
MR. HALE: One other housekeeping — 
THE COURT: Of course. 
MR. HALE: — matter and that is, they filed a 
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. We are ready to come 
forward -
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! And they 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MR. HALE: - today and put on rebuttal evidence. 
- so it seems to me, either they ought to withdraw 
the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, or you ought to deny 
it, one or the other. 
THE COURT: And I will say - well, I'll let 
plaintiff respond, but my understanding was they were 
withdrawing it before we got to court today but I could be 
wrong. 
MR. WISSBROECKER: Well, we were hopeful that the 
Court was going to give us, you know, that we were going to 
get access to the discovery. It's clear that that's not 
going to happen now. So, you know, we will agree to withdraw 
the preliminary injunction motion. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Anything else that we 
need to take care of this morning? Thank you all for your 
patience in dealing with my schedule. Who wants to prepare 
an order? Plaintiff want to do that? 
MR. WISSBROECKER: Sure. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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Sheet 4 uncertainty - yesterday 
16-10a-1328. Procedure for shareholder dissatisfied with 
payment or offer. 
(1) A dissenter who has not accepted an offer made by a 
corporation under Section 16-10a-1327 may notify the corporation 
in writing of his own estimate of the fair value of his shares and 
demand payment of the estimated amount, plus interest, less any 
payment made under Section 16-10a-1325, if: 
(a) the dissenter believes that the amount paid under 
Section 16-10a-1325 or offered under Section 16-10a-1327 
is less than the fair value of the shares; 
(b) the corporation fails to make payment under 
Section 16-10a-1325 within 60 days after the date set by the 
corporation as the date by which it must receive the payment 
demand; or 
(c) the corporation, having failed to take the proposed 
corporate action creating dissenters' rights, does not return 
the deposited certificates or release the transfer restrictions 
imposed on uncertificated shares as required by 
Section 16-10a-1326. 
(2) A dissenter waives the right to demand payment under this 
section unless he causes the corporation to receive the notice 
required by Subsection (1) within 30 days after the corporation 
made or offered payment for his shares. 1992 
